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Abstract
India’s approach to disseminating information about the 
first three cases of the Zika virus was criticised nationally and 
internationally after the issue came to light in May 2017 through a 
World Health Organization news release. We analyse the incident 
from a risk communication perspective. This commentary recaps 
the events and synthesises key arguments put forth by the news 
media and public health stakeholders. We use Peter Sandman’s 
risk = hazard + outrage framework – also adopted by India’s risk 
communication planners – to analyse India’s risk communication 
response and contextualise it against the mandate of the National 
Risk Communication Plan and Integrated Disease Surveillance 
Programme. We conclude with recommendations for India’s risk 
communication policymakers, including the need to develop 
capacity for risk communication research and scholarship in the 
country. 
Introduction
The global decline of the Zika pandemic (1) provides 
an opportunity for India’s public health community to 
reflect upon the management of its own Zika experience 
in 2017. The Indian government’s opaque approach to 
communicating about the first three confirmed cases of 
Zika deserves retrospective reassessment, especially as 
it was widely criticised by the national and international 
media. This commentary will recap the events that unfolded, 
document India’s response, and examine India’s approach to 
communicating with international stakeholders and its own 
citizens. We will examine the challenges of communicating 
high risks to audiences with low perception of risks and 
discuss the ethical dilemmas presented by such situations to 
policymakers, practitioners and researchers.
Zika in India
On May 26, 2017, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
released news about the first three confirmed cases of Zika, all 
of them in Ahmedabad, Gujarat (2). According to official reports 
by the Indian Council for Medical Research (ICMR) (3, 4) the first 
case was of a 34-year old woman who developed fever and 
chills after delivery. She tested positive for Zika virus after her 
blood sample was collected on November 14, 2016. The second 
case was detected during an antenatal care screening and was 
of a 22-year old woman in the 37th week of her pregnancy 
whose sample was collected on January 11, 2017. The 
intensified acute febrile illness (AFI) surveillance efforts after 
the first case led to the detection of the third case, of a 64-year 
old man whose sample was collected on February 3, 2017. [A 
fourth case too was detected on June 29, 2017, in Tamil Nadu, 
but the scope of this commentary is limited to the controversy 
surrounding the first three cases.]
The WHO news release soon amplified into a controversy 
with the national and international media raising several 
questions (5-7). For one, it was unclear why the information 
about the Zika cases, classified as a public health emergency of 
international concern (PHEIC), arrived from the WHO and not 
from the Indian government (8). Journalists and commentators 
questioned why it took the Indian government nearly six 
months after the first case to notify the WHO, when the 
International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) oblige them to 
notify within 24 hours (9). Other reports highlighted potentially 
unethical practices during the AFI surveillance conducted after 
the first case. Specifically, the government was collecting an 
extra blood sample to test for Zika from patients being tested 
for malaria and dengue, without informing those being tested 
(10). Related accounts revealed that in many instances, even 
local civic officials were left uninformed about surveillance 
activities (11). Lastly, the motivations behind the failure to 
update the Zika cases on the Integrated Disease Surveillance 
Programme (IDSP) website  – a government initiative for online 
disease reporting – were also questioned (12). The news media 
thus highlighted various gaps in the government’s information 
and communication management of the situation, and 
questioned the motivation behind withholding information of 
vital importance to public health (13), while experts demanded 
ethical practices, transparency, and accountability (10). 
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In response to the media coverage, the government’s 
communication was passive and scattered. For instance, the 
Ministry of Health issued its first press release (14) on June 1, 
2017, nearly four days after the WHO release, and more than 
six months after the first case was found. While several health 
officials responded individually to questions from a range of 
journalists, health ministers at the central and state levels used 
social media platforms like Twitter, to communicate about Zika. 
The only consistent message was that the government chose 
not to create panic by informing the public about Zika (11). 
Communicating with the WHO 
According to the IHR (2005) (15), member states such as India 
are obliged to notify the WHO of PHEIC cases within 24 hours 
of confirmation. Variances in the compliance of IHR (2005) by 
member states are normally attributed to surveillance-related 
resource constraints among other, more strategic reasons. 
India’s surveillance system had however confirmed the cases. 
The authorities cited WHO’s declassification of Zika as a PHEIC 
(16) on November 18 – days after the first case was found 
positive for Zika – to explain non-compliance with the IHR’s 
24-hour deadline. WHO officials contradicted the government’s 
assertions, pointing instead to the government’s responsibility 
to report cases as these pertained to epidemic-prone diseases. 
These divergent perspectives evoke questions about the 
ambiguities created by Annex 2 (the decision instrument) 
(15) to the IHR which allows governments’ interpretation 
of the listed criteria to be driven by strategic priorities, and 
mechanisms that hold member states accountable for 
non-compliance if reasons for doing so are not resource-
related.  More importantly, India, as an emerging economic 
behemoth, could have utilised this opportunity to demonstrate 
responsible, compliant behaviour to its Asian neighbours and 
the international community at large. Instead, they invited 
criticism for imperilling their neighbours and international 
travellers, risked international goodwill with potential 
implications for tourism within the country, and undermined 
their ability to wield soft power outside of their shores. 
Risk communication during high hazard and low 
outrage  
The onus of managing infectious disease events in 
India is shared by the Centre and the States, a federal 
framework that commands constant coordination and 
communication between agencies at both these levels. 
Based on the Zika ethics consultation between the Pan 
American Health Organization (PAHO) and the WHO (17), 
the Indian public health policy establishment’s actions have 
triggered at least three ethical concerns by keeping the 
public, the media, and local civic officials in the dark: (i) not 
acknowledging the centrality of pregnant women to Zika 
efforts by disseminating adequate and timely information 
about its risks, so as to enable them to exercise appropriate 
choices during pregnancy. This becomes particularly 
relevant as anxieties are bound to rise among pregnant 
women since news of the Zika cases became public; (ii) not 
making complete information about the epidemiological 
burden available to the public in a timely, transparent 
and comprehensible manner clarifying the uncertainties 
surrounding Zika-related risks; and (iii) questionable ethical 
practices while conducting surveillance-related activities, 
such as obtaining additional samples for Zika without 
informing the public about the reasons for doing so (10). 
At a combined level, these concerns refer to a risk 
communication challenge that confronts health policymakers 
in similar situations: what is the appropriate course of action 
when the risk is high and public outrage (or concern) is low? 
To deconstruct this question, it is important to establish that 
its two primary conditions, high hazard and low outrage are 
met. Hazard is defined as the magnitude and probability of 
undesirable outcomes (in this case, being infected with the 
Zika virus), while outrage can be simply understood as the level 
of public concern. 
Even though, the small number of three cases would lead 
us to believe otherwise, a 2016 analysis of travel patterns 
and resident populations in Zika transmission areas by 
Bogoch and colleagues (18) determined that India  along 
with the Philippines, Indonesia, Nigeria, Vietnam, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh,  faced a high risk of local transmissibility of 
Zika leading to a major impact on population health. Among 
the main contributing factors is Aedes Aegypti, the Zika-
transmitting vector that also causes thousands of dengue-
related deaths, a public health threat that India has thus far 
unsuccessfully combated. The magnitude of the Zika threat 
led Indian public health experts to call for strengthening 
surveillance capacity and increasing public awareness 
through robust risk communication preparedness (19, 20). In 
terms of outrage, no published evidence documenting Zika-
related fears or concerns among the Indian public is available, 
which, of course, does not imply that Zika was absent from 
public consciousness. In the absence of such data, we looked 
at social media to provide a reasonable, though limited 
insight into the public’s interest in the issue1. Our analysis 
of Facebook and Twitter data presented in Table 1 found 
limited public response (in terms of shares and likes) to Zika-
related tweets and Facebook posts by India’s leading health 
policymakers, demonstrating low levels of interest; a possible 
indication of low levels of concern.  
Communication challenges in high risk, low outrage 
contexts
Risk communication scholars have long acknowledged the 
communication and ethical challenges during high-risk, 
low-outrage situations, a scenario originally characterised 
by Peter Sandman who formulated risk as a function of 
hazard and outrage (21); and whose work informs the 
government’s risk communication plan. In such a scenario, 
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Sandman recommends “precaution advocacy”, which involves 
communicating to arouse a sense of urgency in the public 
and mobilising them into taking preventive action. While 
lauding the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) for expertly clarifying uncertainties during the
2009 H1N1 pandemic, Sandman highlighted their main
shortcoming: the CDC appealed to the public to maintain
public hygiene without providing them specific actions or
tasks to undertake (22).
While communicating risks during infectious disease events 
such as Zika, Sandman advises policymakers not to over-
reassure the public, as it “can lead to anger and skepticism 
as well, and to loss of essential credibility if the truth turns 
out more serious than predicted” (23). To put Sandman’s 
forewarning into context, repeated reassurances by national 
and state-level officials in India that there was no need to 
panic and that the situation was under control could have 
backfired if the situation had swelled into a major outbreak. 
The subsequent questioning of those in authority and 
identifying actors to attribute the blame  – natural public 
responses during epidemics – might have eventually eroded 
public trust, widely acknowledged as the key determinant of 
the effectiveness of risk communication efforts (24, 25).
In summary, the government should have taken the lead role 
in explaining the threat of Zika to the public based on the 
global situation and clarified the uncertainty surrounding 
the extent to which it will affect the Indian population. 
They should have recommended specific actions for the 
public to undertake to protect themselves, and provided 
frequent updates of the situation even if few cases were 
found. These measures should have been implemented 
through a specialised risk communication team with a 
dedicated, trusted and trained spokesperson and involved 
formal engagement with the news media. The efforts should 
have been underpinned by extensive risk communication 
preparedness efforts at the central, state, and district levels, 
specifying communication strategies for communities, and 
identified key actors who would be involved in responding 
if Zika cases were to be found: considerations whose 
importance increases given the wide variances in cultural 
constructions of disease, media habits, and health-seeking 
behaviours from state to state.
India’s National Risk Communication Plan
The National Risk Communication Plan (NRCP) (26) drafted 
by the National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) offered 
recommendations similar to the strategy described above. 
Tellingly, none of these recommendations appear to have 
been implemented. One such recommendation is Annexure 
3B (p 41) which discusses the challenges with communicating 
uncertain risks such as Zika’s causative links with microcephaly, 
and states: “Insofar as possible, disseminating this information 
before actual cases are diagnosed will help mitigate initial 
concerns.” With no evidence about Zika awareness campaigns 
in the preparedness phase, health officials were quoted saying 
that they consciously chose not to inform the public despite 
being aware of the cases - “We thought there is no need to 
create a hue and cry or create a situation where people start 
panicking.” (8).
The most obvious rationale for this gap between planning 
and execution is that the NRCP provides a generic and rather 
theoretical overview of risk communication principles and 
practices as opposed to providing specific, clear and actionable 
recommendations. In fact, some portions of the document 
present worrisome, simplistic generalisations. For instance, 
section 1.3.1.1 suggests the “silver lining” in a high-hazard 
low-outrage scenario being: “there is little need to listen, or 
to address audience concerns, reservations, or objections; 
this audience has few if any”. One of the possible drivers of 
low outrage among the public could be apathy, the type 
of indifference that might present a formidable barrier to 
future communication interventions. By consequence, it is 
important to identify psychological drivers of apathy such 
as lack of political trust, ignorance about Zika, or a possibly 
misplaced sense of control over the situation. These drivers 
help to develop communication strategies that can effectively 
infuse a sense of urgency in the population without causing 
Table 1: Comparison of public response to social media outreach 
for Zika and dengue by Ministries and Ministers of Health at the 
Centre and Gujarat State
Total Means Zika Means Dengue Means
Prep Resp Prep Resp Prep Resp
Favourites (Twitter)
MoHFW-C 32.44 36.79 14.00 0.00 17.97 44.19
JPN 93.64 75.24 35.40 80.00 146.67 64.90
MoHFW-G 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SC 73.04 149.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Retweets (Twitter)
MoHFW-C 29.09 75.06 15.00 19.00 21.74 41.74
JPN 66.15 353.65 39.20 75.00 136.28 72.20
MoHFW-G 72.00 118.94 0.00 81.00 0.00 0.00
SC 353.30 705.10 0.00 81.00 0.00 0.00
Likes (Facebook)
JPN 975.27 1304.53 156.00 417.00 585.00 1203.25
SC 1245.04 2745.87 0.00 682.00 0.00 0.00
Comments (Facebook)
JPN 33.39 43.55 10.00 12.00 19.33 28.75
SC 49.05 78.95 0.00 27.00 0.00 0.00
Key:  MoHFW-C: Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
MoHFW-G: Gujarat state’s Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Jagat
JPN: Jagat Prakash Nadda, Union Minister of Health
SC: Shankar Chaudhary Gujarat’s Minister of Health
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anxiety (27). Essentially, the NRCP provides minimal nuance 
about the specific challenges of, or recommendations for, risk 
communication in the demographically and culturally diverse 
Indian context beyond a clear articulation of the country’s risk 
communication structures. 
The Integrated Disease Surveillance Program (IDSP)
The failure to update the Zika cases on the IDSP website 
(http://idsp.nic.in) continues to be similarly puzzling.  Launched 
in 2004, the IDSP was conceived to facilitate timely detection 
and reporting of infectious disease outbreaks. Zika updates 
failing to appear on the publicly available disease maps 
through the IDSP website have however raised two concerns 
pertinent to this effort. First, if the IDSP portal is intended to 
disseminate information publicly, providing incomplete or 
inconsistent information – with some diseases reported and 
others not, defeats the mandate of the programme. Second, 
the IDSP established a Media Scanning and Verification Cell 
(MSVC)(28) in 2008  to detect unusual health events through 
an electronic monitoring of national and international news 
media sources, a strategy consistent with recent innovations 
in digital disease detection launched elsewhere(29). However, 
this incident where the media remained in the dark about Zika 
until they received information from the WHO, reveals a curious 
interdependency between the news media and digital disease 
detection initiatives. Essentially, if the media fails to report 
disease cases on account being left uninformed by public 
health agencies, the missing reports will adversely affect the 
reliability of digital disease detection initiatives to capture and 
visually portray public health events through disease maps. 
Also, trusting the media to detect health events but being 
unwilling to trust them as allies in the dissemination process 
reflects a strategic equivocation in terms of engaging them as 
partners in preparedness and response efforts.
Conclusions 
Risk communication during infectious disease events is a 
complex, tricky challenge and, in that spirit, the government’s 
approach can be rationalised along three lines. The popular 
perception of Zika as a threat to pregnant women, vivid 
imagery of babies born with microcephaly, and Zika’s sexual 
transmissibility, form a narrative that could have caused 
confusion and anxiety in a country with nearly 26 million 
childbirths annually. Media sensationalism combined with 
a haphazard uncoordinated risk communication response 
could have led to widespread hysteria as witnessed during 
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Lastly, three isolated cases posed 
a seemingly minimal threat and the surveillance campaigns 
revealed no clusters, and hence did not qualify as an “outbreak”. 
But in adopting a passive and reactive approach multiple 
health officials proffered the “no need to panic” phrase, 
an approach widely established by risk communication 
experts as inappropriate and counter-productive. In fact, 
people tend to panic especially when they are advised not 
to. Such an approach left the journalistic community – who 
should have been proactively engaged – speculating on 
strategic and political motives behind the lack of transparent 
communication, even drawing critical analogies to China’s 
withholding news of the 2003 SARS outbreak (7). Similarly, 
the public were left wondering if more cases remained to be 
revealed as experts lamented the public health establishment’s 
lackadaisical approach. 
Though the government can use the benefit of hindsight to 
claim that they successfully controlled the situation, it can 
be safely argued that India dodged a bullet. While the timely 
intensification of surveillance activities must be rightfully 
recognised, the risk communication surrounding the event 
leaves substantial room for improvement across three 
fundamental areas. 
Recommendations
First, the NRCP might acknowledge risk communication as an 
important pillar in the country’s infectious disease strategies. 
But, its relevance can only be established if it manages to blend 
the vast reserves of West-centric scientific evidence with local 
thinking and insights to develop recommendations and action 
plans tailored specifically to the Indian context. Second, it is the 
public health establishment’s responsibility to develop public 
trust through an ecosystem of transparency and knowledge 
based on an integrated communications approach. For 
instance, the ICMR, NCDC, IDSP all disseminate Zika-related 
fact sheets and reports on their respective websites, but it is 
unclear which of their websites must serve as a central portal 
for the public to access.  It is worthwhile learning from the 
strategies adopted by the US CDC and Singapore’s National 
Environmental Agency to examine whether some of these 
models could be adapted and tested in India. Once developed, 
these initiatives should not be restricted to providing key 
information such as situation updates, but the learnings 
from the establishment’s efforts need to be systematically 
documented and disseminated through various media 
platforms that can be easily accessed by the public, public 
health practitioners and policymakers elsewhere, and by the 
scientific community. Lastly, the Zika situation, and many 
outbreaks preceding it (such as H1N1), repeatedly point to 
the urgent need to address the lacuna in risk communication 
research in India. At the micro level, this will mean developing 
a dynamic repository of scientific evidence chronicling 
the history of risk communication in India, identifying 
effective and not-so-effective communication interventions, 
an in-depth understanding of India’s diverse audiences, 
their communication needs and preferences and psycho-
behavioural responses to different kinds of communication 
stimuli. This effort would benefit through interdisciplinary 
collaborations involving researchers from communication 
studies, public health, and behavioural science, and inter-
sectoral collaborations between researchers, practitioners 
and policymakers. At the meso level, academic investments in 
building scientific capacity (technical, human, and structural) 
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in risk communication research will be critical and can 
benefit from collaborative arrangements between Indian 
and international researchers. Such initiatives will contribute 
towards developing future generations of risk communicators 
who can not only effectively manage public health crises, but 
also engage with public health practitioners and policymakers 
on an ongoing basis to help translate research into policy. 
At the macro level, political support to create enabling 
structures such as research funding mechanisms devoted to 
risk communication and establishing centers of excellence 
can strengthen interdisciplinary thinking in this area, and help 
contribute India-specific evidence in risk communication and 
perception research to the growing, global state of science. 
Notes
1 We extracted publicly available data from the Twitter handles of the 
Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW-C), Gujarat state’s 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW-G), Union Minister of 
Health Jagat Prakash Nadda (JPN) and Gujarat’s Minister of Health, 
Shankar Chaudhary (SC); and Facebook handles of JPN and SC. Facebook 
posts and tweets from January 30, 2016 (when the WHO declared Zika 
as a PHEIC) to July 18, 2017 were analysed by categorising them into 
a) preparedness phase (January 30, 2016 to November 8, 2016) and 
response phase (November 9, 2016 to July 18, 2017). Outreach was 
defined as the number of posts or tweets. Public engagement was 
captured through retweets and favourites for Twitter, and likes and 
comments for Facebook. We also compared Zika outreach with dengue 
as both are transmitted by the Aedes mosquito. The study was approved 
by Northumbria University’s Faculty Ethics Committee. 
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